20 April 1972

MR. COFFEY - FYI

REGISTRY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DD/S REGISTRY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposal for an Intelligence Institute

FILE O & M (MAG)

| FROM: Director of Training 1026 Chamber of Commerce | EXTENSION | NO. DTR-7426 |
| | | DATE |

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DD/S 7 D 18, Hqs.	20 APR 1972			STAT
2.				
3. Ex. Dir. - Compt. 7 E 12, Hqs.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OTR-7426

DD/S 72.1608

1 9 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT   :   Proposal for an Intelligence Institute

REFERENCE   :   ER 72-645, dtd 6 Jan 72, "Independent Study
                      of Problems of Intelligence Management"

STAT

1. [   ] proposal for an Intelligence Institute is much like what I had in mind about three years ago when I came to OTR as its Director.   At the time Dick Helms talked to me about the assignment I did a paper on what I thought OTR could do to broaden its functions in intelligence.   I particularly wanted OTR to take on some of the functions of a graduate school and offer itself as a place to research substantive problems of intelligence.   I have attached that paper for your reference. It will suggest that I agree in essence with what Stan is proposing.

2. The concept of an Intelligence Institute is sound.   I am not entirely convinced that the time is right to inaugurate a formal institute nor do I feel this is the time to bring in Community members.   We can however, introduce the program on an experimental basis, beginning next fall with one or two officers working out of OTR in the Chamber of Commerce building.   Or if it suits the research, we can accommodate   STAT

3. The administrative details supporting an informal program can be easily worked out.   There is the problem of the Deputies releasing men or women for a sabbatical of this kind; beyond that is the problem of topics the Deputies will approve for "confrontation."   [   ]

STAT

suggested, for example, research on advances in information theory and how the advances would affect the way the Agency is organized to collect, process, and produce intelligence in the seventies and eighties. This topic itself could challenge two or three officers at one time, each working on a different aspect of it.

STAT

4. I would like to discuss the idea of the Institute further with you. After that it would be worthwhile to hear more from [   ] I would be willing to meet with him and other members of MAG, if the group wishes. There is much more that can be said in support of the proposal.

HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Director of Training

STAT

Att

Distribution:
    Orig & 1 - Adse
        1 - DD/S
        2 - DTR
        1 - EA/P

OTR/HTC [   ] (12 April 72)

STAT

(About November 1968)

A Proposal for the Office of Training

A. The need

1. For many years OTR has been a good tradecraft college.

2. Now it is time to broaden and deepen its function:

   Without neglecting the how of intelligence, start concentrating
   on the what and the why.

3. Reason: American interests in the outside world are undergoing
   rapid and profound change. This change is likely to accelerate
   over the next ten years.

   That means that American foreign policy is also in for profound
   change.

   And that means that Intelligence will also change, to a greater
   degree than we are yet prepared to cope with.

4. We should now add to OTR some of the functions of a graduate school -

   With some of the overtones of the Institute for Advanced Study
   at Princeton.

   And some of the product of those think-tanks like Stanford Research
   Institute and the Institute for Defense Analyses - though with
   greater relevance and vastly less expense than characterize
   such outside outfits.

   a. A place to study the functions of intelligence.

      1) Especially the connections between collection and production,
         between human and technical resources, between minimum
         essential requirements and the nice-to-know.

      2) Methods of evaluation for accuracy, relevance to policy needs,
         validation of past judgments and approaches. (A serious
         analytical history of military estimates on the Soviet
         Union would be salutary. So would a validation study of
         the JIIRG Report, some three years after its adoption
         in 1966.)

      3) Methods of analysis - e.g., the tyranny of dubious statistics
         over intelligence judgments and the validity of feeding
         these judgments into Pentagon computers for planning
         purposes. (One crying need is for a hard look at the
         institutionalized delusions of the National Intelligence

-2-

Projections for Planning. Everyone knows they are
phony, but when all the axes have been ground into
impressive tabulations they are treated like con-
firmations strong as Holy Writ.)

b. A place to assign long-range substantive problems. E.g. -

1) World-wide problems which will have important long-range
effects on both US interests and the role of US Intel-
ligence in helping understand those effects - especially
the problems of population and food, world trade, monetary
systems.

2) Some typical examples from Latin America:

a) The political and social role of the military establish-
ments.

b) The political and social role of the Catholic Church.

c) The political and social role of the oligarchies.

d) The long-range economic outlook.

e) The effect of rising anti-US nationalism.

3) Similar subjects from other parts of the world, especially
the backward parts. For example, why did every Indonesian
expert in the US Government assume in September 1965 the total
absence of any internal force capable of preventing a Com-
munist takeover of Indonesia?

c. A place to keep track of research projects of general interest,
both to attract a maximum of useful contributions and to avoid
duplication. Perhaps the academic custom of occasionally
issuing a list of works in progress would be useful.

d. A place to support the researches of NIPE into community problems -
e.g., the Nolting Report on the Middle East and the Shute Report
on Early Warning.

e. A place to develop connections with the scholarly world, with
the aim of winning eventual quasi-public awareness of the
conscientiousness and accuracy of intelligence research.
(And incidentally of educating the public to get over the
notion that intelligence equals espionage and covert action
and no more.)

-3-

B. The method

1. Upgrade OTR into an Institute of Intelligence, on a recognizable par with the Foreign Service Institute.

2. Create a Division of Studies.

    a. Not permanently staffed by all the experts necessary to do the types of long-range research suggested above, but so organized as to:

        1) Stimulate, facilitate, and keep track of such research as it may be carried out all over the outfit.

        2) Provide a temporary haven where experienced senior officers can profitably spend a few weeks or months (e.g. between assignments) studying some specific problem, uninterrupted by current managerial responsibilities, meetings, and telephones. Not a disposal device or a WPA leaf-raking project, it could be useful only if it were seen as a serious opportunity by the directorates. Subjects for study might emerge from discussion of some problem at the DCI's morning meeting, or be proposed by others. For example, a senior African expert might study all our Estimates on Black Africa and contribute to answering the question whether we are estimating on the right subjects with the right emphasis.

        3) Bring experts on a given problem together from time to time in order a) to assure that the Agency's great assets in these fields are most usefully marshaled, and b) to help break down the lingering tribalism that still keeps the Agency's tribes unnecessarily isolated from one another. (At present the two principal devices serving this purpose are the Mid-Career Course in OTR and the rather brief in-house discussions of early drafts of Estimates. More cross-fertilization is needed.)

25X1   4) Specifically, conduct "graduate seminars" of people carefully selected from all over the Agency, to meet for two or three days at [ ] on a specific program of related topics all having to do with, say, the US interest in Cuba, or the Soviet interest in the subcontinent of Asia, or the long-range utility of Comint or computers.

        5) Set a high standard for scholarly discipline in depth and accuracy of research, and in strength and clarity of presentation.

-4-

6) Facilitate the publication of worthy products of this research. For some time to come this would mean publication within the intelligence community, but we ought also to prepare for the day when it will be politically possible to allow Agency scholars to publish outside the community such worthy works as [   ] recent long study of anti-US nationalism in Latin America. Until that day comes we ought to give such studies far more accurate editing and more respectable physical production than they sometimes receive nowadays. Such publication would be a reward for work well done; it could be made into an attractive incentive for doing work of real and fairly lasting value, and gradually lessen our present practice of publishing some ephemera for morale purposes.

7) Specifically, make better use of Studies in Intelligence for identifying appropriate subjects and publishing results as far as possible.

8) Look for ways of involving some of the Career Trainees in such a program, perhaps as temporary research assistants to old hands involved in research projects. Objectives:

   a) A kind of on-the-job training.

   b) A way of interesting the Career Trainees in the long-range problems of intelligence.

   c) Identifying any special aptitudes they have, and giving them an earlier sense of participation in the intelligence process than they can get from classroom training alone.

3. In short, provide a vehicle to the DCI and the directorates for carrying out those kinds of research into the current and prospective problems of functions, methods, and substance which they themselves identify as needing attention. Nothing proposed here would be intended to diminish either the jurisdiction or the responsibilities of management as presently constituted. The proposal looks rather toward the development of a center for scholarship which each senior manager could use as he saw fit and to the degree he was willing to support its serious objectives.

25X1